It is hard to escape the whiff of Bush v Gore that hangs over the case, and not only because the respondents were represented by Messrs. Olson and Boies and the case was resolved on an exceptionally expedited basis. As in Bush v Gore, the Court seemed motivated to intervene because of the importance of the ultimate issue--there, the presidential election and, here, the constitutionality of restrictions on marriage--rather than the need to resolve the specific legal question presented. The result in both cases was a sharply divided per curiam opinion that resolved virtually nothing except the outcome of an individual case. 67 Also as in Bush v Gore, *172 the five Justices who joined the unsigned opinion seemed motivated to intervene by an almost personal distaste for what they saw as result-oriented procedural irregularities in the lower courts' actions. 68 This played out in an unusual feature of the opinion: its repeated references to Chief Judges Walker and Kozinski by name rather than simply by position, as if to announce that the Court was watching them personally, and skeptically.
Finally, as in Bush v Gore, there was an odd mismatch between the identity of the claimant and the nature of the legally cognizable injury on which the majority fastened. In Bush v Gore, George W. Bush, the Republican candidate for president, invoked the equal protection rights of individual voters and alleged that those voters' ballots were being counted under different standards in different parts of the state. The most plausible remedy for a voter to seek in such a case would have been an order that the ballots be reviewed uniformly. Instead, because his real interest was winning the election quickly, Bush argued for a halt to the recount that left ballots uncounted, basing his arguments on the lateness of the hour. In Hot-lingsworth, the rights ostensibly being vindicated were also only indirectly those of the parties. The defendant-intervenors claimed that streaming the trial posed a risk of intimidation to potential witnesses who might thereby decline to testify or modify their conclusions, presumably to the disadvantage of the defendant-intervenors' case. But if the risk to their case had been the defendant-intervenors' sole basis for relief, they might have faced a serious problem obtaining a stay. Presumably, they would have needed to show a real additional risk to the witnesses from streaming their *173 testimony over and above whatever risk might come from their appearance in a courtroom already otherwise open to the public. And it would have been especially hard to identify that risk with respect to expert witnesses or official ballot proponents (the two categories of witnesses they planned to call), since those individuals had sought substantial publicity for their views in a variety of settings already. Had the defendant-intervenors based their arguments against televising the trial solely on how it might affect their defense at trial, they could well have found themselves saddled with a factual finding from the district court that there was no risk they would be deprived of due process. © 2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
So the defendant-intervenors instead invoked procedural claims about the adequacy of the process by which the decision to televise the trial had been made--essentially pressing the rights of those members of the public whose ability to participate in the rulemaking process had been short-circuited by precipitous adoption of the rule. This had the benefit of framing the issue more as a question of law that could be litigated before the Court de novo. But as Justice Breyer's dissent observed, the defendant-intervenors were in an awkward position to claim lack of adequate notice. Whatever the general public's awareness of the possibility of trials being televised, the parties actually complaining about it in court had known for months that Chief Judge Walker was considering doing so in their case.
As a question of law, moreover, the adequacy of the notice-and-comment process was a close one. The relevant statute provided that a rule for the conduct of business in the federal courts "be prescribed only after giving appropriate public notice and an opportunity for comment." 69 The statute nowhere defined "appropriate"; it certainly set no specific length for an appropriate comment period, To be sure, there are situations in which a lengthy comment period would be appropriate, both to ensure that relevant stakeholders become aware of the proposed change and have time to evaluate it and to enable the preparation of comments dependent on extensive empirical or legal analysis. The Supreme Court pointed to two court of appeals cases that had suggested, in response to the fact that the Administrative Procedure Act similarly contained no specific time period, that administrative agencies should "'usually' *174 provide a comment period of 'thirty days or more."' 70 But Hollings-worth seemed an odd case in which to announce a rule of general applicability about the length of a legally required period. For one thing, the district court received 138,574 comments during the week-long comment period it provided, 71 and it is hard to imagine that another three weeks would have changed anything about the overall tenor of the comments. More fundamentally, more or better public comments about the change to the Northern District of California's Civil Local Rule 77-3 would not, in any event, have directly addressed the Supreme Court's real concerns, which were quite specific to the California marriage litigation. The rule change did not require that trials be broadcast. It simply created a potential exception to the preexisting ban on broadcasting trial-level proceedings for cases in the Ninth Circuit's pilot program. 72 Even had the rule been in place for years, after months of public comment, nearly all of the Supreme Court's declared problems with the district court's decision to permit remote streaming in this case would presumably have been the same. None of those complaints had anything to do with novelty per se.
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The crux of the Supreme Court's concern was not really a failure to provide a sufficient notice-and-comment period for a local rule that would permit district judges to decide on a case-by-case basis whether to permit broadcasts. Rather, as the per curiam opinion acknowledged, even "[i]f Local Rule 77-3 had been validly revised, questions would still remain about the District Court's decision to *175 allow broadcasting of this particular trial, in which several of the witnesses have stated concerns for their own security." 74 The Court declared the California marriage case "not a good one for a pilot program," precisely because it "involve[d] issues subject to intense debate in our society." 75 The Court pointed with approval to the kinds of proceedings that had been televised in other federal district courts--ones that "were not high profile or did not involve witnesses." 76 The Court's position raises two related questions. The first goes to the nature of the interest in televising trials. It seems paradoxical to broadcast trials only in cases where the public has little desire to watch them--what we might call the "lowprofile" rationale. Remote public access to judicial proceedings, like other First Amendment-inflected interests, should not be "limited to things that do not matter much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its substance," as the Court once reminded us in the free speech setting, is access to cases "that touch the heart of the existing order." 77 The streaming of a trial can serve its educative function only if people care enough to watch.
That the trial in question involved witnesses actually offers additional reasons why audiovisual distribution might serve important functions. Direct and cross-examination provide a mechanism for the "dialectic" and "back and forth" that Justice Souter urged in his Osborne dissent. While not all of the beliefs that underpin individuals' views on access to marriage rest on empirical claims, many do. And while the trial process is hardly the only way to evaluate the truth value of such claims, it happens to be one traditional and *176 important way to do so in our society. Citizens' ability to observe for themselves how well witnesses defend views on empirical questions when those witnesses cannot escape cross-examination and must answer under oath might influence their own answers to those questions. The Confrontation Clause of the Constitution rests on a similar intuition that jurors can better assess the merits of a witness's assertions if they have the ability to see the witness, rather than simply read his testimony or a third party's account of what the witness said. Having found no public interest on the side of permitting remote audiovisual distribution, an equities balancing was almost an afterthought. Indeed, the per curiam's view was foreshadowed in the way the opinion started its statement of the facts. After noting that Proposition 8 was designed to overturn the California Supreme Court's decision giving same-sex couples the right to marry, the opinion launched immediately into an account of the plight of Proposition 8 supporters who alleged "harassment as a result of public disclosure of their support." 82 That account elided completely the distinction between criminal conduct and constitutionally protected activity. It is one thing to use death threats, vandalism, or physical violence against potential witnesses as a justification for limitations on the degree of public access courts should provide. It is quite another to privilege the First Amendment activity of Proposition 8's proponents over its opponents.
But that is what the Court implicitly did when it included, in its litany of "harassment," the allegation that opponents "compiled 'Internet blacklists' of pro-Proposition 8 businesses and urged others to boycott those businesses in retaliation for supporting Although the Court did not focus directly on the issue here--leaving that discussion for Doe v Reed--technological innovation played some role in the adverse treatment of Proposition 8 supporters. The Court's account suggests it may have played some role in its decision, as well. Websites like eightmaps.com--which, overlaid onto a Google map, shows the names of individuals who donated to pro-Proposition 8 campaign committees along with their approximate location, the size of their contribution, and sometimes their employer--made it far easier for harassers or attackers to locate and contact their targets, 89 as well as for neighbors, colleagues, and customers to conduct unwanted yet constitutionally protected conversations. But these technologies were independent of the remote streaming of trial testimony to a handful of federal courthouses at issue in Hollingsworth, and the Court made no serious effort to explain any connection. 90 Instead, it uncritically adopted the defendant-intervenors' contention that some witnesses might decline to participate if the proceedings were televised.
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The Court indicated its concern for three types of witnesses--"members of same-sex couples," "academics" (by which it seemed to mean expert witnesses), and "those who participated in the campaign leading to the adoption of Proposition 8" (which seemed a reference to the defendant-intervenors). 91 But, in reality, the Court's entire analysis boiled down to a claim about testimony by inter-venor-retained expert witnesses. It would make no sense to take the defendant-intervenors' word on whether the same-sex couples (that is, the plaintiffs) or their "academics" would be chilled from testifying; the plaintiffs were represented by high-powered counsel who were entirely capable of protecting their clients' interest, and those counsel had consistently supported the district court's intention to broadcast the trial to the public at large. Even with respect to a potential chilling effect on the defendant-intervenors or their witnesses, there was a real question about the plausibility of any claimed chill. The defendant-intervenors had turned themselves into public figures through pervasive media appearances during the Proposition 94 The Court's discussion there, however, had focused on the effects of commercial broadcasting on percipient witnesses in a criminal trial. 95 The Court did not consider the fact that in *180 the intervening years, many courts had televised their proceedings without constitutional objection. Many of the factors identified in Estes as problematic seemed inapposite to Perry. The risk that "memories may falter, as with anyone speaking publicly," 96 does not apply to expert witnesses, who are not generally testifying on the basis of memories to begin with. Unlike percipient witnesses, experts are generally expected to "shape their own testimony as to make its impact crucial" in light of the other testimony being offered. 97 Moreover, expert witnesses, unlike percipient ones, are seldom involuntary participants in the trial process; they agree to appear in full awareness of the potential for "withering cross-examination." 98 In Hollingsworth, the Court brushed these distinctions aside, writing that its concerns "are not diminished by the fact that some of applicants' witnesses are compensated expert witnesses" because " [t] here are qualitative differences between making public appearances regarding an issue and having one's testimony broadcast throughout the country." 99 The Court gave no hint as to what those qualitative differences might be.
Testifying at a trial is, of course, not the same as making a public appearance, where one can refuse to go before a hostile audience or to answer uncomfortable questions. But isn't that the point?
Across a variety of dimensions, the Supreme Court remains a holdout in an era of immediate information. For many years, the Court released transcripts of oral arguments that failed to indicate the name of the Justice asking a question. Even now, the 
II. DOE V REED: POPULAR LAWMAKING AND UNPOPULAR POSITIONS
Given the Court's solicitude for the fears of potential expert witnesses in Hollingsworth, its decision later in the Term permitting Washington State to release the names of people who petitioned to put its domestic partnership law up for popular vote was perhaps a bit surprising. The fractured nature of the Justices' analysis (the case produced seven opinions) reflects the fact that however divided the Court may turn out to be on questions of gay rights and marriage equality, it is already splintered on questions about the constitutional structure of the political process. The position of marriage *183 traditionalists within that process simply adds another layer of complexity.
In 2009, Washington State adopted a new domestic partnership law. Referred to as the "everything but marriage act," 111 the law expanded the rights and responsibilities of state-registered domestic partners to make them largely equivalent to those of married couples. In response, opponents of the new law formed a political committee--Protect Marriage Washington--and sought to hold a referendum. In order to force one, they were required to obtain valid signatures from slightly more than 120,000
voters. 112 Protect Marriage and its allies collected over 137,000 signatures, which they submitted to the secretary of state in July 2009. 113 He certified the measure, commonly referred to as "R-71." As a result, the law was suspended pending the results of the referendum.
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Within a month, several supporters of the domestic partnership law had filed requests with the secretary for copies of the R-71 petitions. They invoked the state's Public Records Act, which generally permits public access to "any writing containing information relating to the conduct of government." 115 In recent years, the secretary of state's office had released a number of petitions connected with initiatives, but it had never before received a request for a *184 referendum petition. The election went forward without the signatories' names being disclosed and the voters approved the new domestic partnership law.
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Following the election, the Supreme Court granted certiorari, 123 and Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court. 124 Despite the language of the pleadings, he recast Count I as a facial challenge to the Public Records Act, rather than an as-applied challenge. The explanation he gave was that the relief the petitioners *185 sought--an injunction preventing the release of referendum petitions--"reach[ed] beyond the particular circumstances" of their case.
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At first blush, it is not entirely clear why the Court felt the need to classify Count I as a facial challenge, which is the sort of claim the Roberts Court has generally frowned upon. 126 After all, the Court itself recognized that the claim straddled the line:
"The claim is 'as applied' in the sense that it does not seek to strike the [Public Records Act] in all its applications, but only to the extent it covers referendum petitions. The claim is 'facial' in that it is not limited to plaintiffs' particular case, but challenges application of the law more broadly to all referendum petitions." 127 While the first of those two sentences is clearly true, the second seems to expand the category of facial challenges significantly. If as-applied challenges are restricted to cases where the relief extends no further than the "particular circumstances" of the plaintiffs themselves, a significant number of constitutional challenges that have until now been understood to be as-applied challenges will be treated as facial attacks instead. Countless plaintiffs seek injunctive relief that will benefit others whose particular circumstances differ along at least some dimensions.
128
Even in class actions, for example, courts permit *186 named representatives to seek relief under a typicality standard.
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Recasting the dividing line between facial and as-applied challenges as one that turns on the nature of the relief requested makes little sense given the spillover consequences of many constitutional adjudications.
Given that at least five Justices were prepared to reject an as-applied challenge, as well, 130 it was unclear why the Court postponed that issue. Moreover, as members of the Court had previously recognized, relegating election-related litigation to as-applied challenges poses serious problems if one element of a successful as-applied challenge is a showing of how the practice operated in a particular instance. 131 Justice Thomas's solo dissent and Justice Alito's solo concurrence picked up on this point. 132 Circulators of *187 a petition, Justice Thomas explained, will be unable to provide evidence of risk "specific to signers or potential signers of that particular referendum" at the time they decide to circulate a petition. 133 If voters demand public anonymity as a condition of signing petitions, permitting circulators to challenge disclosure at some later date by showing that some signatories have faced harassment will do nothing to protect either the circulators' or the signers' interests: Without the ability to promise anonymity, circulators will be unable to persuade some voters to sign. As Justice Alito put it, an "asapplied exemption becomes practically worthless if speakers cannot obtain the exemption quickly and well in advance of speaking." 134 Having agreed on the problem, Justices Thomas and Alito diverged on the solution. For Justice Thomas, the "significant practical problems" with requiring as-applied challenges led him to address the claim as a facial challenge, and © 2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
ultimately to conclude that disclosure regimes are facially unconstitutional--a result consistent with his dissent in Citizens United unifying idea is the fear that if courts wait to adjudicate claims of constitutional infringement until individuals facing "particular circumstances" experience feared injuries, there will be no cases to adjudicate. Individuals will forgo exercising their rights rather than risk the consequences of the offending statute. 141 The blurring of categorical lines continued when the Justices turned to the merits of Protect Marriage's constitutional challenge.
The starting point for the majority's analysis was the holding that petition signers are engaged in First Amendment-protected expression. At the very least, by signing a referendum petition, a signer is indicating a belief that the issue in question ought to be put up for popular vote; presumably, most signatories also are expressing their opposition to the law being subject to the referendum. 142 Regulations targeting political speech generally trigger the most searching judicial scrutiny. Indeed, the Court had long ago determined that "the circulation of a petition [to place an issue on the ballot] involves the type of interactive communication concerning political change that is appropriately described as 'core political speech."' 143 A decade earlier, the Court had therefore struck down a Colorado statute that required signature gatherers to wear name badges on the grounds that such a disclosure requirement might deter their participation. 144 And earlier in the Term, the Court had reiterated that " [l] aws that burden political speech are 'subject to strict scrutiny,' which requires the Government to prove that the *189 restriction 'furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest."' 145 But Chief Justice Roberts's opinion in Doe adopted a decidedly more deferential approach. He pointed to "a series of precedents considering First Amendment challenges to disclosure requirements in the electoral context" that had, he wrote, "reviewed such challenges under what has been termed 'exacting scrutiny."' 146 The "exacting scrutiny" standard, he explained, "requires a 'substantial relation' between the disclosure requirement and a 'sufficiently important' governmental interest. To withstand this scrutiny, 'the strength of the governmental interest must reflect the seriousness of the actual burden on First Amendment rights."' 147 In short, "exacting scrutiny" was less exacting than strict scrutiny, which would have required a compelling, rather than a merely "important," government interest and would have required narrow tailoring, rather than simply a "substantial relation" between the disclosure regime and that governmental end. 148 Thus, "exacting scrutiny" resembled most closely the sliding scale the Court had already adopted for a variety of other election-related regulations--such as limitations on write-in voting 149 or voter identification requirements 150 --that did not implicate core political speech at all.
The Court's prior decisions had not squarely stated that the phrase "exacting scrutiny" constituted a term of art--like "strict scrutiny" or "rationality review"--with a distinct framework for assessing whether the government's interest was sufficiently weighty or the fit between the statute and that interest was sufficiently tight. Rather, cases often used the phrase in an offhanded way that suggested it was a description of conventional strict scrutiny. 151 The spate of separate opinions took wildly different positions on the nature of the First Amendment interest at stake and therefore, not surprisingly, on the framework for analyzing the petitioners' claims. At one end of the spectrum, Justice Scalia, concurring in the judgment, denied that petition signers had any First Amendment right to "partial anonymity" at all. 153 His approach was avowedly historical: "Our Nation's longstanding traditions of legislating and voting in public refute the claim that the First Amendment accords a right to anonymity in the performance of an act with governmental effect." 154 As a matter of Washington constitutional law, voters within the referendum process are exercising legislative power. Such power, Justice Scalia explained, was traditionally exercised publicly. Indeed, the United States and many state constitutions expressly require recording legislative action, including the votes of individual legislators. To be sure, the referendum was a turn-of-the-twentiethcentury device, 155 and the only direct evidence we had of the Fram-ers' views was that they structured the federal government to avoid it altogether. But, in keeping with his professed commitment to original public meaning originalism, Justice Scalia pointed out that the town hall meeting of the eighteenth century was a precursor to popular lawmaking. At the time of the framing (and since, for that matter), participation in town hall meetings was always public. More expansively, Justice Scalia argued that even if participation in the referendum process were treated simply as voting, rather than legislating, there was no originalist support for anonymity as a constitutional *191 requirement. Vive voce voting was commonplace at the time the First Amendment was ratified and for years thereafter. And the adoption of secret ballots in the latter part of the nineteenth century apparently rested on arguments about ordinary policy--most notably, concerns with vote buying and corruption--rather than on appeals to constitutional privacy concerns. 156 Four other Justices assigned the First Amendment interests more weight, but not by much. Justice Sotomayor, in a concurrence joined by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, pointed to the public nature of "the process of legislating by referendum" as a reason for treating any First Amendment-based interest in nondisclosure as relatively slight. 157 Justice Stevens, in his opinion concurring and concurring in the judgment, which was joined by Justice Breyer, likewise downplayed any strong First Amendment interest in participating anonymously. Although the "democratic act" of signing a petition "does serve an expressive purpose, the act ... is 'not principally"' one of individual expression; rather, it serves the public function of "sorting those issues that have enough public support to warrant limited space on a referendum ballot." 158 As a result, both Justice Sotomayor and Justice
Stevens concluded that Washington State was entitled to considerable deference in applying the Public Records Act to the R-71 petitions. Justice Sotomayor found it "by no means necessary" for a state to show that its restrictions "are narrowly tailored to its interests." 159 Because Justice Scalia had found no First Amendment rights implicated at all, it seems as if five Justices actually
would not have applied "exacting scrutiny" if that term really means anything. Justice Sotomayor denominated her opinion a concurrence, rather than a concurrence in the judgment. Justice Stevens did not expressly identify the parts of the opinion of the Court he found inconsistent with his concurrence in part and in the judgment. So while there was technically an opinion for the Court, it is not entirely clear that all the analysis in that opinion in fact garnered support from a majority of the Justices.
At the other end of the spectrum, Justices Alito (in a solo concurrence) *192 and Thomas (in a solo dissent) saw the case as implicating core constitutional principles of privacy. Particularly in light of their extensive invocations of history four days later in McDonald v City of Chicago, 160 it is striking that they did not engage, let alone dispute, Justice Scalia's account of the original understanding of the First Amendment. Justice Alito repeatedly described the circulators and signers of petitions as "speakers," 161 and also referred to their "right to privacy of belief and association." 162 In contrast to the majority, who treated the act of signing a petition as an individual act of expression, Justice Thomas characterized signers as engaging in First Amendment-protected "political association." 163 And unlike the Court, he believed that the appropriate standard was conventional "strict scrutiny," which would require the state to show that disclosure under the Public Records Act was "narrowly tailored--i.e., the least restrictive means--to serve a compelling state interest." Modern technology inflects privacy in a number of ways, and Justices Alito and Thomas seemed strongly influenced by those considerations. The "state of technology today," Justice Thomas declared, "creates at least some probability that signers of every referendum will be subjected to threats, harassment, or reprisals if their personal information is disclosed.
[T]he advent of the Internet enables rapid dissemination of the information *193 needed to threaten or harass every referendum signer." 166 Justice Alito emphasized that if signers' names were posted on the internet, "then anyone with access to a computer could compile a wealth of information about all of those persons." 167 He detailed the information retrievable through on-line links, ranging from the amount of their mortgage to newspaper articles about their children's athletic activities before concluding that " [t] he potential that such information could be used for harassment is vast." 168 Regardless of how they characterized the right at issue, the eight Justices who agreed that some First Amendment-based interest was at stake were faced with the need to balance those interests against the state's countervailing considerations. 169 Washington had asserted two justifications for its disclosure regime: first, an electoral integrity rationale focused on combating fraud and promoting governmental transparency; second, an informational rationale focused on giving voters information about the source of a petition's support. 170 The most remarkable aspect of the Court's brief discussion of the integrity rationale was just how unexacting "exacting scrutiny" turned out to be--something more akin to rationality review than to strict scrutiny. In rationality review cases, courts do not ask about a law's actual purpose. Rather, they often hypothesize some purpose that fits the challenged classification. They require only the most relaxed fit between the challenged law and a permissible government purpose. Nor do they require much empirical evidence of such a link, instead asking whether "any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify [the challenged law]." 171 I think it is a fair bet that when Washington's voters enacted the state's Public Records Act, they were not thinking of how disclosure of ballot petitions would combat fraud in the electoral process. But on the basis of relatively thin evidence, the Court hypothesized that disclosure would enable the public to backstop the secretary of state's verification process, enable individuals to discover that their names *194 had been forged on petitions, and deter bait-andswitch fraud in which voters are induced to sign petitions based on misrepresentations about the nature of the ballot measure.
Finding that concerns with electoral integrity provided a sufficient basis for disclosure, Chief Justice Roberts's opinion declined to address the informational rationale. The Court discussed the case as if disclosure would lead only to more accurate signature verification, and thereby enhance public confidence in the electoral process.
But had the Court addressed the informational rationale, it would have had to confront more directly the range of uses to which electoral information can be put and where to draw the line between legitimate and unacceptable uses. At a wholesale level, aggregated information about a measure's supporters serves long-recognized legitimate purposes. Such information can provide voters with a useful cue in deciding how to vote on a ballot measure. For example, if the bulk of a petition's signatures are gathered in heavily Democratic or heavily Republican neighborhoods or from relatively wealthy or relatively less affluent parts of the state, this can tell a voter something about the predicted impact of a particular measure. 172 By contrast, both the groups requesting the petitions and the petitioners in Doe seemed more focused on the retail use of information--namely, the identification of individual signatories for the purpose of enabling opponents of the referendum to contact them. The opponents hoped that voters supporting same-sex couples' rights would engage in core political speech with neighbors, coworkers, relatives, and acquaintances who had signed the petition. 173 The proponents feared that signatories would be subjected to harassment and retaliation by strangers. As I have already suggested, *195 174 the line between protected First Amendment activity and retaliation can be hazy. Would refusal to associate with a measure's supporters, for example, be an instance of the former or of the latter? And can that question necessarily be answered in the abstract? On top of the conceptual haziness rest challenging empirical questions. What is the likelihood that disclosure will produce valuable robust debate as opposed to impermissible harassment or intimidation? If it produces both, in what proportions will they occur?
More fundamentally, because none of the other Justices engaged Justice Scalia's originalist account, they did not grapple with another potential justification for requiring participants in the referendum process to act publicly. As Justice Scalia described, historically one rationale for requiring citizens to cast their votes publicly was precisely its effect on their decision making.
Vive voce voting required a voter to "show at the hustings the courage of his personal conviction." 175 It forced the voter, in short, to be accountable. This loss of accountability was precisely why the English political philosopher John Stuart Mill opposed the adoption of the secret ballot:
The best side of their character is that which people are anxious to show, even to those who are no better than themselves. People will give dishonest or mean votes from lucre, from malice, from pique, from personal rivalry, even from the interests or prejudices of class or sect, more readily in secret than in public. And cases exist ... in which almost the only restraint upon a majority of knaves consists in their involuntary respect for the opinion of an honest minority. 176 The practice of direct democracy itself, and not only disclosure laws regulating it, "significantly implicates competing constitutionally protected interests in complex ways." 177 On the one hand, it allows greater public participation in the lawmaking process. On the other hand, as many scholars have noted, direct democracy lacks many *196 of the braking features that protect minorities in republican, rep-resentative politics.
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One way to get a handle on the possible effect of public accountability on voter decision making is to think about the "Bradley effect." The idea is that the votes actually cast for minority candidates lag behind the estimates derived from survey data--including exit polls, which involve voters being asked not to predict how they may vote but to report how they actually voted, generally within minutes of doing so. 179 The conventional explanation for the effect centers on voters' unwillingness to be thought to have cast their votes on the basis of a candidate's race. 180 Most recently, the 2008 presidential primaries may have involved a refinement of the Bradley effect: The gap between survey data and actual vote totals for Barack Obama was lower in caucus states, where voters must indicate their preference publicly, than in primary states with secret ballots. 181 The Bradley effect raises the question whether a state might permissibly balance its competing desires to permit direct public input into the legislative process and to reduce the discriminatory potential of direct democracy by instituting a disclosure regime.
The countervailing argument, of course, is that the electoral system is supposed to report voters' preferences, and not to shape them, or at least not to shape citizens' fundamental beliefs about critical issues of public policy. 182 In some ways, the contemporary *197 understanding that voters are free to cast their ballots on whatever basis they choose may explain why none of the other Justices took an originalist approach. Public voting occurred in an era when voting itself was not yet viewed as a fundamental constitutional right. 183 In such a world, states' control over the electoral process would have been virtually plenary. 184 Thus, when it came to voting and views on marriage, the Supreme Court in 1885 upheld the disen-franchisement of polygamists because states should be entitled to "withdraw all political influence from those who are practically hostile" to "the basis of the idea of the family, as consisting in and springing from the union for life of one man and one woman in the holy estate of matrimony." 185 If the state could outright disenfranchise such citizens, then a disclosure rule that deterred individuals from expressing those views might be less problematic than it would be today. Once the Court had held that "'[f]encing out' from the franchise a sector of the population because of the way they may vote is constitutionally impermissible," 186 there is a strong argument that a voter's choices should be protected, not only from illegal acts, but from other forms of pressure as well.
The Doe Court's decision to address only the facial challenge--leaving the petitioners' as-applied claim to be litigated in the first instance before the district court--enabled the Court essentially to sidestep the petitioners' relatively case-specific predictions of ha-rassment and intimidation. The Court emphasized that the question before it was not whether disclosure of the R-71 petitions, or even other controversial ballot measures more generally, posed a "reasonable *198 probability" of impermissible action against signatories. 187 Rather, the petitioners had to show that across the broad range of ballot measures, including the arcane and the mundane, there was a significant risk of harassment or intimidation. This they could not do. Washington and other states had disclosed petitions regarding a variety of issues in recent years "without incident" 188 --indeed, apparently without objection. And the steady stream of citizen-driven ballot measures on controversial issues further suggests that the prospect of disclosure (if in fact voters are even aware of the possibility) seems not to have chilled petitioning activity. Although Chief Justice Roberts's opinion for the Court suggested that signers who demonstrated a "reasonable probability of harassment" might prevail in an as-applied challenge, what constitutes such a probability is unclear.
Justice Alito, in his separate opinion, claimed that Protect Marriage Washington had a "strong argument" that disclosure violated the First Amendment "as applied to the Referendum 71 petition." 189 The evidentiary basis for his argument was the assertion of "widespread harassment and intimidation suffered by supporters of California's Proposition 8." 190 The source for that claim was in turn the Court's earlier statements to that effect in Hollingsworth v Perry and Justice Thomas's dissent in Citizens United.
But those statements in turn were based on allegations of intimidation and harassment, rather than evidence subjected to any official assessment or adversarial testing. To be sure, several of the allegations involved criminal behavior, such as threats or vandalism. Some of that vandalism, however, was the sort of near-universal behavior that attends nearly all heated elections--for example, the destruction or removal of campaign yard signs. Nothing about that activity suggests what the comparable activity would be against petition signatories, whose political speech is further removed from opportunities for retaliation.
Moreover, other allegations characterized as "threats and harassment" in the complaint on which Justice Thomas had relied In contrast, Justices Sotomayor and Stevens announced standards for assessing as-applied challenges that made it unlikely that any plaintiff will ever prevail in preventing disclosure of his signature on an initiative or referendum petition. Justice Stevens observed that "[a]s a matter of law, the Court is correct to keep open the possibility" that a plaintiff could challenge disclosure, but almost immediately shut the door to claims about disclosure regimes like the Public Records Act. Even "a significant threat of harassment" would not be enough, in his view, unless that threat "cannot be mitigated by law enforcement measures." 194 This could mean that absent conditions like those in the mid-century American South, whence came the anonymity cases like NAACP v Alabama 195 --and which hardly describe life in even the bluest of states today--a challenge to general disclosure requirements will fail. Justice Sotomayor similarly announced the view that "any party attempting to challenge particular applications of the State's regulations will bear a heavy burden," and would limit as-applied challenges to the *200 "rare circumstance in which disclosure poses a reasonable probability of serious and widespread harassment that the State is unwilling or unable to control." and the situation confronting marriage traditionalists today. 198 In Alabama and Arkansas, not only were African Americans pervasively excluded from the formal political process altogether, but they faced official suppression, pervasive private violence to which the government never responded, and discrimination across the entire range of civic life. In distinguishing NAACP v Alabama, the more liberal wing of the Court implicitly rejected the claim that marriage traditionalists were a group needing such special solicitude from the courts. By contrast, Justices Alito and Thomas seemed to see a kinship between two sets of movement activists subject to reprisals and needing judicial protection from (or even within) majoritarian political processes. That perception of kinship was to play out more fully in Christian Legal Society, where questions of First Amendment association were more directly at stake than in the fleeting association attached to signing a petition circulated by an evanescent group. In their solicitude for opponents of marriage equality, the conservative Justices seemed not to notice another, ironic, historical parallel: Opponents of marriage equality were essentially complaining about being "outed" by gay people and their supporters who had come out of the closet to participate actively in politics.
*201 III. CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOCIETY V MARTINEZ: SEXUAL ORIENTATION, RELIGION, AND THE RELATIONSHIP AMONG STATUS, CONDUCT, AND BELIEF

Herbert Wechsler infamously identified the central question in Brown v Board of Education as a "conflict in human claims of
high dimension, not unlike many others that involve the highest freedoms." 199 He asked, Given a situation where the state must practically choose between denying the association to those individuals who wish it or imposing it on those who would avoid it, is there a basis in neutral principles for holding that the Constitution demands that the claims for association should prevail? 200 At least with respect to the claims of African Americans, that conflict was resolved during the 1960s and 1970s by the political process and judicial acquiescence. The antidiscrimination statutes of the Second Reconstruction, upheld by the Supreme Court, came down heavily on the side of nondiscrimination and full inclusion. 201 This past Term saw a reprise of the conflict, this time involving sexual orientation rather than race. The University of California Hastings College of the Law (UC Hastings) denied official recognition to a student organization that excluded gay students from membership. The organization sued, claiming a violation of its First Amendment rights to freedom of speech, freedom of association, and free exercise of religion. Ultimately, the Court upheld the law school's decision. Along the way, the Justices revealed vastly different worldviews when it comes to what Justice Scalia years ago referred to as the "culture wars" over gay rights. 202 The barely *202 suppressed rage in Justice Alito's dissent supporting the Christian Legal Society may reflect the Justices' sense of who's winning that battle.
The Christian Legal Society (CLS) is a national association of Christian lawyers and law students. It had long required all members to sign a Statement of Faith embracing the group's principles. In early 2004, the society adopted a resolution declaring that engaging in "acts of sexual conduct outside of God's design for marriage between one man and one woman" was "inconsistent" with the society's foundational belief "and consequently may be regarded by CLS as disqualifying such an individual from CLS membership."
203
At the beginning of the 2004-05 academic year, the leaders of a preexisting and officially recognized Christian students' group at UC Hastings decided to affiliate the group with CLS. 204 Shortly thereafter, the students applied to the law school for travel funds to attend a national CLS conference. The law school provided such funding only to registered student organizations (RSOs). Accordingly, the Hastings CLS submitted a copy of its new bylaws as part of the registration process.
That was where the trouble began. The UC Hastings administration determined that the group's bylaws did not comply with the school's Nondiscrimination Policy, which provided in pertinent part that school-sponsored activities would not "discriminate unlawfully on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, ancestry, disability, age, sex or sexual orientation." 205 After some back and forth, the school denied the group RSO status. This meant the group was ineligible for certain financial benefits and access to certain law school facilities. © 2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
Hastings CLS sued. Both the society and the law school moved for summary judgment. In a fairly lengthy opinion, the district court granted the school's motion, concluding that UC Hastings' "uniform *203 enforcement of its Nondiscrimination Policy" 206 passed constitutional muster as a regulation of conduct whose incidental effects on First Amendment rights were justified by the school's "compelling interest in prohibiting discrimination on its campus." 207 The Ninth Circuit affirmed in a one-paragraph, unpublished opinion that stated, in its entirety, The parties stipulate that Hastings imposes an open membership rule on ail student groups--all groups must accept all comers as voting members even if those individuals disagree with the mission of the group. The conditions on recognition are therefore viewpoint neutral and reasonable. 208 The arguments before the Supreme Court concerned, to an unusual degree, a factual question: What precisely was the UC Hastings policy at issue? 209 Justice Ginsburg, in her opinion for the Court, relied on a stipulation between the parties to describe the regulation as "an all-comers policy." 210 UC Hastings required RSOs to open their membership to all students, subject to "neutral and generally applicable membership requirements unrelated to 'status or beliefs,"' such as paying dues, refraining from misconduct, or achieving distinction on a skill-based test such as a journal writing competition. 211 By contrast, Justice Alito's dissent insisted that the school's actual policy was not an all-comers rule. As he saw it, groups were entitled to exclude students on any basis other than those listed in the school's Nondiscrimination Policy, which proscribed exclusion on only a "limited number of specified grounds." 212 He further claimed that the school's actual practice was more arbitrary.
Although UC Hastings had denied CLS's application for RSO status, it had granted that status to other groups that discriminated on bases enumerated in the Nondiscrimination Policy--most notably *204 La Raza, which Justice Alito claimed had limited membership to Latino students. 213 The heated language surrounding this factual disagreement 214 raises the question why the Justices cared so much about the precise contours of the UC Hastings policy. Some part of the disagreement seemed to center on the school's bona fides. The dissenters, in particular, hinted that the school's refusal to recognize the Christian Legal Society reflected little more than antireligious bigotry--"prevailing standards of political correctness," Left Coast-style. 215 The majority, by contrast, criticized the dissent for "impugning the veracity of a distinguished legal scholar and a well respected school administrator." 216 It credited the law school's account of its policy as designed to provide equal educational opportunities to all students, encourage interaction among students, and vindicate state antidiscrimination principles.
But both an all-comers and a nondiscrimination policy forbidding exclusion on only specified bases would serve the school's goals, at least to some extent. In fact, one of the justifications for the allcomers policy was its utility in enforcing the overarching Nondiscrimination Policy. The main consequence of characterizing UC Hastings' policy as an all-comers rule was to relieve the Court of the need to address CLS's claim that a nondiscrimination policy itself constitutes a form of impermissible viewpoint discrimination. That claim has some intuitive appeal: A nondiscrimination policy permits groups formed around criteria not enumerated in the policy to exclude students on the basis of viewpoint--for example, Silenced Right, a pro-life group, could exclude students who favored abortion rights, and the Hastings Democratic Caucus could reject students who were Republicans--while not according groups identified in terms of the enumerated criteria, such as religion, the right to restrict *205 membership to people who share their beliefs. 217 All nondiscrimination rules are, as Wechsler observed, nonneutral in at least one sense: They identify particular reasons or motivations as illegitimate bases for a decision, while leaving actors free to act on the basis of other characteristics. 218 In this sense, nondiscrimination law is viewpoint based because it treats the view that an individual's religion or his sexual orientation is relevant to whether he should be accorded a benefit differently from views, for example, that his test scores or his political affiliation can be taken into account. 219 But unless the entire edifice of modern antidiscrimination law is to be declared unconstitutional, a government's decision not to permit public discrimination on the basis of religion or sexual orientation cannot © 2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
really be understood as viewpoint discrimination of the type the First Amendment disfavors. Indeed, in his Romer dissent, Justice Scalia recognized this point, writing that "homosexuals are as entitled to use the legal system for reinforcement of their moral sentiments" through enactment of antidiscrimination laws "as is the rest of society." 220 Focusing on an all-comers rule also enabled the Court to side-step the question whether CLS was seeking to exclude gay students based on those students' belief, their conduct, or their status. 221 For tactical *206 reasons, CLS had argued that it was not engaged in status-based discrimination. It claimed that it excluded students not because they were gay, but rather because of "a conjunction of conduct and the belief that the conduct is not wrong." 222 Had CLS not qualified its policy in this respect, it would have faced the unappealing prospect of having to explain how its status-based membership restrictions could be sustained without also compelling official recognition and support of student groups that discriminated on the basis of race or gender. CLS hoped to avoid that problem by claiming that while race or gender are matters of status, homosexuality (and religion) are not. That possibility is reinforced by the Court's reference, in the course of upholding UC Hastings' policy as "reasonable," 230 to California's treatment of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation on the same terms as discrimination on the basis of gender, race, or religion. 231 Although the Court referred only to California's statutory antidiscrimination requirement, it may well have been aware also of the California Supreme Court's recent decisions holding that, under the state constitution's equal protection clause, discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation should be subjected to the same heightened scrutiny accorded to discrimination on the basis of race or gender. 232 In his concurrence, Justice Stevens drew the parallel between various protected aspects of personal identity even more tightly. "A person's religion," he observed, "often simultaneously constitutes or informs a status, an identity, a set of beliefs and practices, and *208 much else besides. (So does sexual orientation for that matter, notwithstanding the dissent's view that a rule excluding those who engage in 'unrepentant homosexual conduct' does not discriminate on the basis of status or identity.)" strong illustration of their perspective was the fact that the only "claim of unlawful discrimination" they saw implicated by UC Hastings' policy belonged to CLS. 237 The dissenters never stopped to consider why UC Hastings might have adopted a Nondiscrimination Policy in the first place; they ignored entirely the problem of discrimination against groups other than religious traditionalists. For the dissenters, religious conservatives seemed to be the most marginalized and victimized group within *209 the legal academy. 238 Left unsaid, but perhaps in the back of their minds, is the sense that nowhere is the process of full inclusion for gay people, even at the cost of overriding religious objections, further along than in San Francisco, where UC Hastings is located. 239 The dissent's near-paranoia came through most clearly in its claim that Hastings' policy rendered groups like CLS vulnerable to infiltration or hijacking. Justice Alito expressed the fear that "[a] true accept-all-comers policy permits small unpopular groups to be taken over by students who wish to change the views that the group expresses." 240 He was not reassured by the absence of any example in the record of "RSO-hijackings at Hastings." 241 Nor did he offer any plausible explanation for why students would join a group for the purpose of destroying it. His hypothetical example of how such a "threat" might play out was itself telling:
Not all Christian denominations agree with CLS's views on sexual morality and other matters. During a recent year, CLS had seven members. Suppose that 10 students who are members of denominations that disagree with CLS decided that CLS was misrepresenting true Christian doctrine. Suppose that these students joined CLS, elected officers who shared their views, ended the group's affiliation with the national organization, and changed the group's message. The new leadership would likely proclaim that the group was "vital" but rectified, while CLS, I assume, would take the view that the old group had suffered its "demise." Whether a change represents reform or transformation may depend very much on the eye of the beholder.
242
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What the dissent seemed not to notice was that a similar dynamic, only in reverse, produced--and rather recently, at that--the Hastings CLS whose views the dissent saw as entitled to protection from change. From the 1994-95 academic year through the 2003-04 academic year, UC Hastings had several avowedly Christian RSOs (including one that had called itself "Hastings
Christian Legal Society" 243 ) whose expressed objectives were "to encourage those who identify themselves as followers of Jesus Christ to more faithfully live out their commitment in their personal and academic lives, to prepare members for future lives as Christian attorneys, and to provide a witness and outreach for Jesus Christ in the Hastings community." 244 At the same time, those RSOs each agreed in their bylaws to comply with UC Hastings' Nondiscrimination Policy. In the two years prior to the emergence of the current group, the Hastings Christian Fellowship's bylaws provided that the organization "welcomes all students of the University of California, Hastings College of law" and the organization admitted members without regard to religion or sexual orientation, 245 Hastings CLS emerged from this inclusive organization 246 through a "takeover." Three students became the leaders of the small group (around a dozen members) at the end of the 2003-04 academic year and "decided to affiliate their student organization officially" with CLS, thereby triggering the adoption of the exclusionary membership rules to which UC Hastings objected.
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But the central point--which the dissent never confronts--is that it is in the nature of student groups to change. If the next cohort of Christian students to enroll at UC Hastings were to join CLS and then decide to "end[] the group's affiliation with the national organization, and change[] the group's message," why should anyone care? To be sure, the national Christian Legal Society must remain free to disaffiliate student chapters that do not hew to its policies. But that group is not entitled itself to participate in UC Hastings' limited public forum, because that forum is limited to *211 groups comprised entirely of current students. I cannot see anyone with a legally cognizable interest in cementing into place a set of bylaws that do not attract support from the existing cohort of students. In a sense, UC Hastings' all-comers policy adopts John Hart Ely's anti-entrenchment principle: By requiring that groups remain open to all students, the policy keeps the current officers or membership from "choking off the channels of political change to ensure that they [or their values] will stay in and the outs will stay out." 248 The dissent's fear, by contrast, almost seems to presuppose that it is entirely sensible for a Christian legal society (with a lower-case "l" and "s") to exclude gay students. It is clear with which "beholder" the dissent has aligned its eyes. And the dissent in Christian Legal Society reflects the same sense underlying the per curiam in Hollingsworth v Perry as well as Justice Alito's concurrence and Justice Thomas's dissent in Doe v Reed--the sense that traditionalists face distinctive threats demanding special judicial solicitude.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Court ended its foundational opinion in Griswold v Connecticut 249 by declaring that marriage "is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects.
Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions." 250 Griswold was a case about both marriage and privacy: the defendants sought to keep the government out of their marriage. Today, however, the fundamental legal question about marriage involves assertions of positive rights rather than negative liberties: Same-sex couples demand not that the state stay out of their marriages, but that the state admit them to a civic institution.
The struggle over marriage equality is a cause. How to referee that struggle poses profound questions of political and jurisprudential faith. Along the way, as this Term shows, there will be a series of subsidiary disputes that raise issues of method, as well as marriage. Standing, the distinction between facial and as-applied challenges, the scope of rationality review and of "exacting scrutiny," *212 adherence to originalism in the face of rapid social and technological change, and the continuing vitality of antidiscrimination law--each involves questions likely to dog the Court for years to come. If this Term's cases are any indication, the Court will divide along a variety of dimensions.
But the Court must confront more than doctrinal complexities. The marriage cases raise anew the recurring question of when the Court should intervene to declare that a contested social or political issue has been resolved as a matter of constitutional law, and how it should deal with the losing side. Few institutions are more deeply rooted in the popular consciousness than marriage. That is why it always appears, regardless of the Justice writing the opinion, in the list of fundamental rights protected by the substantive due process principle. 251 But in asking what that tradition means today, the Court is being called upon to police an "evolving boundary" 252 between marriage as it used to be and marriage as it is becoming. Obviously, litigation--albeit litigation in state courts raising state constitutional claims--has played a significant role, not only in achieving marriage equality directly but also in changing the context of the national debate. The Supreme Court's decisions, when they come, will do the same. How the Justices answer the marriage question may influence the Court's political and moral capital with future generations in the way that the Court's substantive due process decisions in Dred Scott v Sandford, 253 Loving v Virginia, 254 and Roe v Wade 255 have done for previous generations. And so, precisely because feelings about marriage are so fundamental to so many people, there may be two institutions whose future is on the line: marriage and the Court. In the states that have constitutionalized the nonrecognition of same-sex marriage, it seems plausible to assume that it may be harder to achieve marriage equality through the political process than would otherwise be the case. 
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See Neuborne, Gravitational Pull of Race (cited in note 17).
31
I say "constitutional" here because I expect that once Congress passes antidiscrimination legislation protecting individuals on the basis of sexual orientation--for example, something like the proposed Employment Non-Discrimination Act, which would provide Title Vll-style protection--that legislation will generate litigation as well. To be sure, even some of that litigation will raise constitutional questions.
32
See Lawrence, 539 US at 578 (stating that the Court's decision "does not involve whether the government must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter"); id at 585 (O'Connor, J, concurring in the judgment) (reserving the question whether "other laws distinguishing between heterosexuals and homosexuals would similarly fail under rational basis review"
and describing "preserving the traditional institution of marriage" as a "legitimate" state interest); id at 590 (Scalia, J, dissenting) (declaring that state laws against same-sex marriage are "called into question by today's decision"), 
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I say "nearly any" because California constitutional law did impose one important substantive restriction (along with more quasiprocedural restrictions, such as the requirement that any initiative deal with only a single subject). Voters could only "amend," but not "revise," the state constitution through the initiative. A constitutional "revision"--which involved a more fundamental change in the constitution--could be accomplished only through a more deliberative process. 
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Id at 716 (Breyer, J, dissenting).
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Id at 708 (opinion of the Court). Section 2071 contains the general rulemaking powers of the federal courts. Subsection (a) authorizes the Supreme Court "and all courts established by Act of Congress" to "prescribe rules for the conduct of their business." Subsection (b) requires that such rules "shall be prescribed only after giving appropriate public notice and an opportunity for comment," but subsection (e) provides that "[i]f the prescribing court determines that there is an immediate need for a rule, such court may proceed under this section without public notice and opportunity for comment, but such court shall promptly thereafter afford such notice and opportunity for comment." 
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To be precise, the Supreme Court continued the earlier-ordered stay, which was to remain in effect "pending the timely filing and disposition of a petition for a writ of certiorari or the filing and disposition of a petition for a writ of mandamus." Hollingyworth, 130 S Ct at 715. Given that the trial lasted only a few weeks, the stay had the practical effect of being a permanent injunction. While the defendant-intervenors did file a petition for a writ of certiorari in mid-April, that petition was dismissed by stipulation a month later. See Hollingswortb, 130 S Ct 2432 (2010). In response to the Supreme Court's decision, a troupe of actors set about doing a reenactment of the trial and subsequent proceedings on You Tube. See MarriageTrial.com. Going beyond verisimilitude, the troupe also had an actor read the district court's decision on the merits aloud--a five-hour undertaking.
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Hollingswortb, 130 S Ct at 706.
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Compare Bush v Gore, 531 US 98, 109 (2000) (per curiam) (stating that the Court's decision was "limited to the present circumstances, for the problem of equal protection in election processes generally presents many complexities"), with Hollingswortb, 130 S Ct at 709 (declining to "here express any views on the propriety of broadcasting court proceedings generally" and declaring that its review was "confined to a narrow legal issue: whether the District Court's amendment of its local rules to broadcast this trial complied with federal law"), and id at 717 (Breyer, J, dissenting) (stating that "this legal question is not the kind of legal question that this Court would normally grant certiorari to consider," given that there was no conflict among the lower courts over the procedures by which district courts change their rules and that "[t]he technical validity of the procedures followed below does not implicate an open 'important question of federal law"') (citing Sup Ct R 10(c)). 
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And had the rule been amended significantly earlier--for example, before the passage of Proposition 8 or before the filing of the complaint in Perry--it seems implausible that the defendant-intervenors or the witnesses who felt chilled would have participated in any notice-and-comment rulemaking. They would have had no reason to anticipate that at some point in the future they would be participants in a case to whose broadcast they would object. Thus, the defendant-intervenors were injured not so much by the truncated opportunity to comment on the proposed amendment of the local rule as by the substance of the amendment. 09-cv-02292-VRW (ND Cal Jan 6, 2010) (Doc 363) (doubting that "a run-of-the-mill is the kind of case that will provide the civic lesson that might be helpful," and adding that "the only time that you're going to draw sufficient interest in the legal process is when you have an issue such as the issues here, that people think about, talk about, debate about and consider"). The Supreme Court's own practice seems in some tension with its position here. Traditionally, the Supreme Court generally did not release the audiotapes of oral arguments until years afterward. But in certain cases of intense public interest--for example, Bttsb v Gore and the University of Michigan affirmative action cases--the Court released the tapes within a few minutes after the argument ended. And this Term, the Supreme Court began releasing the tapes of all oral arguments on the Friday of the week in which they occurred. See http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_audio.aspx. The Public Records Act itself was the product of an initiative. Another provision of the act makes explicit its populist cast: The people of this state do not yield their sovereignty to the agencies that serve them. The people, in delegating authority, do not give their public servants the right to decide what is good for the people to know and what is not good for them to know. The people insist on remaining informed so that they may maintain control over the instruments that they have created. This chapter shall be liberally construed and its exemptions narrowly construed to promote this public policy and to assure that the public interest will be fully protected. 
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Justice Scalia, as we shall see, saw no First Amendment right implicated to begin with. Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, and Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Breyer, each issued concurrences that made it quite plain that they would apply a test that could not be met in this case. Only the Chief Justice, who delivered the opinion for the Court, and Justice Kennedy, who joined that opinion and was otherwise uncharacteristically silent (along with Justice Ginsburg, he was the only Justice who did not write), provided no insight into how they would have approached an as-applied challenge. It is for state legislatures to weigh the costs and benefits of possible changes to their election codes, and their judgment must prevail unless it imposes a severe and unjustified overall burden upon the right to vote, or is intended to disadvantage a particular class. Judicial review of their handiwork must apply an objective, uniform standard that will enable them to determine, ex ante, whether the burden they impose is too severe. Id at 208.
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Interestingly, Justice Thomas agreed with the Court that the petitioners had brought a facial challenge. But unlike the majority, he would have applied the Salerno "no set of circumstances" standard. See Doe, 130 S Ct at 2838 (Thomas, J, dissenting). Or, rather,
